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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 45327
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CR-2011-22281

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Hawley failed to show any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Hawley Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Reversal Of The District Court’s Order Denying
His Rule 35 Motion
While on probation for a 2003 conviction for lewd conduct with a child under 16 in
Bonneville County case number CR-2002-23050, Hawley was working at Karcher Mall (despite
being prohibited from working there as a condition of his probation) and “while working there,
he solicited multiple minor females for naked pictures of them and/or to allow him to touch them
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or for them to touch him in exchange for free merchandise.” (7/6/17 Tr., p.4, Ls.16-24; PSI, p.12. 1) The state charged Hawley with sexual battery of a minor child 16 or 17 years of age, with
an enhancement for having previously been convicted of a registerable sex offense. (R., pp.2629.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hawley pled guilty to an amended charge of felony injury to
children and the state agreed to recommend a period of retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.40-45.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, ordered that the
sentence run consecutively to Hawley’s sentence in the Bonneville County case, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.67-69.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
suspended Hawley’s sentence and placed him on supervised probation for three years. (R.,
pp.74-77.)
Hawley subsequently violated his probation by repeatedly associating with minor
females, having unsupervised contact with children and “providing them with gifts,” working at
the Karcher Mall and hiring a minor to work with him, attempting to hide his contact with
minors from his supervising officer and treatment team, using a cellular phone to send text
messages that were “sexual in nature,” leaving his assigned district without permission “on
numerous occasions” for “both sexual and non-sexual” purposes, engaging in sexual
relationships without approval, violating his curfew on numerous occasions, and continuing to
have contact with and engage in a sexual relationship with a specified female after he was
instructed to have no contact with the female. (R., pp.82-88, 112-13, 122-23.) On February 24,
2015, the district court revoked Hawley’s probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R.,
pp.122-23.)
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Hawley Conf.
Exhibits #45327.pdf.”
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On March 27, 2015, Hawley filed a Rule 35 motion requesting that the district court
reduce his sentence because he believed it was “an illegal sentence inasmuch as the plea
agreement reached at the original sentence was to run concurrent with the Bonneville [C]ounty
case.” (R., pp.124-25.) The district court denied the motion, finding that Hawley’s sentence was
legal and was consistent with the plea negotiations. (R., pp.128-31.)
On January 26, 2017, following a post-conviction proceeding, the district court entered a
judgment granting Hawley “the right to file a motion for relief pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35” within 120 days. (R., pp.140-41.) Hawley filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence
on March 28, 2017, once again requesting that the district court order that his sentence in this
case run concurrently with his sentence in the Bonneville County case. (R., pp.142-43.) On July
19, 2017, the district court entered an order denying Hawley’s Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.211-13.)
Hawley filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., pp.214-17.)
Hawley asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion
for a reduction of sentence in light of his continued support from others, appropriate behavior
while incarcerated, and because, during a hearing in Hawley’s Bonneville County case, Judge
Simpson stated, “I have no objection to [the sentences] running concurrent.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.4-6 (citing R., pp.151-66).) Hawley has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence
under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on
appeal, Hawley must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
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information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id.
Hawley has failed to satisfy his burden.
Hawley contends that the district court should have granted his Rule 35 motion by
ordering that his sentences in this case and the Bonneville County case run concurrently with one
another because, during a probation violation disposition hearing in Hawley’s Bonneville County
case, Judge Simpson stated that he had no objection to the sentences running concurrently.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) Hawley fails to mention, however, that Judge Simpson indicated this
lack of an objection only after Hawley’s counsel incorrectly represented that Judge Wiebe had
already ordered that the sentences run concurrently when she imposed Hawley’s sentence in this
case (in 2012). (R., pp.152-53, 156-58.) Moreover, as stated by Judge Simpson, “The Canyon
County matter is the newest case. I assume, based on what’s been told to me, that that case has
been run concurrent with this matter, and that’s how it should work if it’s going to run
concurrent. I have no objection to it running concurrent. But where that’s the newer case, that’s
the judge that should order that.” (R., p.158 (emphasis added).) Hawley’s observation that a
judge in a separate case – in which Hawley was convicted and sentenced more than eight years
before he was sentenced in this case – did not object to the district court in this case running the
sentences for both cases concurrently is not “new” information that establishes an abuse of
discretion, particularly because the decision whether the sentence in this case should be
concurrent or consecutive to the sentence in the prior case was entirely within the discretion of
the district court in this case. See, e.g., State v. Murillo, 135 Idaho 811, 814, 25 P.3d 124, 127
(Ct. App. 2001) (“Whether the sentence for one crime should be consecutive to the sentence for
another is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).
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Hawley further contends that the district court should have granted his Rule 35 request
because he completed sex offender treatment and counseling while he was on probation and
because he continues to have support from others and to exhibit acceptable behavior while
incarcerated. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6 (citing R., pp.193-94, 198-99, 203-06).) This is likewise
not “new” information, as information with respect to Hawley’s support from others, completion
of programs, and acceptable behavior while incarcerated was before to the district court at the
time that the court revoked Hawley’s probation and executed his underlying sentence. (PSI,
pp.97-114, 116-17.) Furthermore, acceptable behavior is no less than what is expected of
inmates committed to the Department of Correction. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773, 229
P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (Trial court's denial of defendant's motion for reduction of sentence was
not an abuse of discretion; defendant's prison behavior did not provide valid grounds for a
reduction in sentence).
At the hearing on Hawley’s Rule 35 motion, the district court stated, “Generally, this
defendant must show that the sentence was excessive in light of any new or additional
information and I find that this defendant has not made that showing so I'm going to deny the
motion.” (7/6/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.2-6.) Because Hawley presented no new evidence in support of his
Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having
failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district
court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order denying
Hawley’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2018.

__/s/_Kenneth K. Jorgensen______
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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